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Abstract 
 Monkeys form expectations for outcomes based on interactions with human 
experimenters.  Not only do they anticipate receiving rewards which the experimenter 
indicates, but capuchin monkeys, a cooperative new world monkey species, apparently 
anticipate rewards based on what the experimenter has given to their partner.  However, 
this could be due to subjects responding to either outcomes or experimenters.  Here we 
examine whether capuchin monkeys will continue to interact with human experimenters 
who are occasionally unreliable.  We tested ten monkeys with a series of familiar human 
experimenters using an exchange task.  The experimenters had never before participated 
in exchange studies with these monkeys, hence the monkeys learned about their behavior 
during the course of testing.  Occasionally experimenters were unreliable, failing to give 
a reward after the monkey returned the token.  We found that monkeys did recognize 
these interactions as different, responding much more quickly in trials following those 
which were non-rewarded than in other situations with the same experimenter.  However, 
subjects did not change their preference for experimenters when given the opportunity to 
choose between the unreliable exchanger and another exchanger, nor did subjects learn to 
prefer reliable experimenters from watching other monkeys’ interactions.  Instead, 
subjects returned the tokens to the same location from which they received it.  These 
results indicate that capuchin monkeys may not be sensitive to isolated instances in which 
experimenters are unreliable, possibly because of a strong bias to returning the token to 
the location from which it was donated. 
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Introduction 
 Monkeys and apes are sensitive to expectations, reacting negatively when 
expectations are violated (e.g. Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, Tinkelpaugh, 1928).  For 
almost a century, it has been known that macaques (Macaca spp.) will respond negatively 
when a reward is surreptitiously switched by the experimenter, leaving them with a less 
desirable reward than anticipated (Tinklepaugh, 1928).  In this case, the monkeys formed 
expectations for what they should receive based on outcomes which were indicated for 
them. More recent work indicates that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) may also form 
expectations for what they should receive based on outcomes for their partners.  These 
monkeys respond negatively when a partner gets a better reward than they do after having 
completed the same interaction with the experimenter (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; 
Fletcher, 2008; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).  In these cases, expectations were apparently 
based on reward outcomes, but primates may also form expectations about certain 
individuals with whom they interact. 
 In daily interactions, individuals face the question of whether they should 
continue interacting with existing social partners, or find a new partner.  Although there 
is a cost to forming a new relationship, there is also a cost to continuing to interact with a 
social partner who is not fulfilling expectations, often known as cheating or defection. 
Thus, individuals may do best to rapidly evaluate interactions and cease interaction if 
necessary.  Judgments of partner reliability are known in several species (e.g. fish: 
Bshary & Grutter, 2006), including primates.  Capuchin monkeys are much more likely 
to continue to cooperate with conspecific partners who share rewards with them (Brosnan 
et al., 2006; de Waal & Berger, 2000).  Chimpanzees, too, cooperate more frequently 
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with individuals who share with them (Melis et al, 2006 a & b).  These apes are also able 
to evaluate interactions between human experimenters and choose to associate with the 
individual who is generous to one who is selfish (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 
2008), although other species of ape do not appear to make this distinction (Russell et al., 
2008).  Finally, New and Old World primates (including apes) appear to be sensitive to 
others’ intent, distinguishing between experimenters’ intentional and accidental actions 
(Call et al., 2004; Phillips et al, in press; Wood et al, 2007).  Once a partner has been 
determined to be unreliable, it may take effort to restart the relationship.  In a cooperative 
situation, tamarins follow a tit-for-tat variation, called two-tits-for-a-tat, requiring two 
cooperative interactions from a previous defector before cooperation will re-start (Chen 
& Hauser, 2005).   
Aside from individual learning, animals may learn with whom to cooperate from 
watching others.  If a social partner interacts with two others, one of whom is reliable and 
one of whom is not, others observing this should choose to interact with the reliable 
partner.  In the chimpanzee study mentioned earlier, chimpanzees were also able to learn 
which experimenters were generous by watching them interact with other chimpanzees 
(Subiaul et al., 2008).  Among capuchin monkeys, we know that individuals acquire 
information from watching others (Perry et al., 2003), and individuals can learn which of 
two tokens yields a higher reward after watching a conspecific exchange only 20 times 
with an experimenter (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004b).  On the other hand, knowledge about 
how a potential partner acts with a conspecific may not be informative regarding that 
individual’s reactions with others, including the observer. To our knowledge, this has not 
been empirically tested in primates.  However guppies do prefer to associate with 
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conspecifics who have cooperated with them in the past (Dugatkin & Alfieri, 1991), but 
they do not prefer to associate with the more cooperative of two conspecifics, after 
watching them interact in a cooperative task (Brosnan et al., 2003).   
For this study, we investigated how monkeys respond to a social partner who does 
not reliably complete an interaction.  We did this using a familiar exchange paradigm, in 
which subjects exchange a token with a human experimenter to receive a reward (e.g. 
Brosnan & de Waal, 2004b).  We intentionally designed the experiments so that subjects 
were exposed to very few unreliable exchanges, to determine how subjects responded to 
an isolated incident of cheating rather than whether subjects could learn over time to 
avoid certain experimenters.  Familiar experimenters (with whom the monkeys had never 
done exchange tasks) interacted with the monkeys, some of whom failed to return the 
offered reward on some occasions (unreliable exchangers).  For this, we predicted that 
capuchins would continue to interact with unreliable experimenters in situations in which 
the risk was low (experimenters rewarded the majority of exchanges), but would reduce 
interaction when the risk was high (many unrewarded exchanges).  We then investigated 
whether these subjects continued to interact with these unreliable exchangers, and 
whether they took an opportunity to interact with a new experimenter.  Here we predicted 
that subjects would choose to interact with the second experimenter, rather than the 
unreliable one, when given the option to do so.  We finally investigated whether subjects 
would learn to avoid unreliable exchangers from observing interactions with other 
individuals.  Here we predicted that after watching an unreliable exchanger, subjects 
would be more likely to interact with the other available experimenter. 
General Methods 
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Subjects 
 The subjects included 10 adult and subadult brown capuchin monkeys (3 adult 
males, 2 subadult males, and 5 adult females) housed in two social groups at the Yerkes 
National Primate Research Center, in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. All but one of the adult 
females were pregnant and/or carrying a dependent offspring at some point during testing. 
 The groups in which the subjects lived were housed in two large, indoor/outdoor 
enclosures (de Waal, 1997). Each enclosure contained ample three-dimensional climbing 
space as well as trapezes, perches, and enrichment items. Purina small primate chow was 
provided twice a day, at approximately 9:30 hours and 17:30 hours. Monkeys received a 
tray consisting of fruit, vegetables, and bread with a protein solution every day at 
approximately 17:30 hours, and running water ad libitum. We followed this feeding 
schedule regardless of the day’s testing, and subjects were never food or water deprived.  
 The subjects had previously been trained to enter transport cages, which allowed 
us to place individual animals into a test chamber with their cooperation. Individuals 
were comfortable with this procedure and were well habituated to the test chamber. The 
test chamber was divided by a mesh partition into two equal sized (36 X 60 X 60 cm) 
compartments, and all testing was carried out in only one of these compartments. The test 
chamber was backed by an opaque panel, so in the test chamber the subjects had vocal, 
but no visual or tactile, access to their group. This allowed us to interact with subjects in 
a controlled manner with minimal distractions from the group. Dependent offspring were 
always allowed into the test chamber with their mothers. 
 All but 2 of these individuals had previously been used in food sharing and 
cooperation studies in our lab and all had extensive experience interacting with humans.  
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However, these individuals were all mother reared and none have been separated from 
the group or intensively trained in any way (e.g. language training) that could have 
caused them to associate more with humans than their own species. 
Exchange Paradigm 
 For this study, exchange was operationally defined as the subject returning an 
inedible token to the experimenter, for which the subject received a food reward (Hyatt & 
Hopkins, 1998). Unless otherwise noted, we defined exchange as the experimenter giving 
the token(s) to the subject, then standing in front of the test chamber with left hand 
outstretched, palm up, as a begging gesture, and holding the reward above the left hand 
with the right hand. Subjects received the reward upon the placement of the token into the 
exchanger’s left hand. If tokens were thrown out of the test chamber or were not placed 
into the experimenter’s hand, the subjects were not rewarded.  
All subjects had participated in two prior tasks involving exchange and so no 
training was required (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a, 2004b). In these experiments, subjects 
always received the rewards they were offered for completing the exchange interaction.  
In one previous study (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004b) subjects watched a conspecific 
interact with the experimenter to learn the value of a set of tokens.  We videotaped all 
sessions, along with time in hundredths of a second, on either a Super-VHS or digital 
video recorder and data were later collected from the videotapes by S.F.B. A second 
observer collected latency data during testing. 
 Subjects underwent a number of different experiments, each consisting of some 
procedure repeated multiple times. Throughout, “test” referred to an experimental type, 
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“trial” to the procedure that was repeated multiple times per test, and “session” to the set 
of trials for a particular test (i.e. a test consisted of a multiple-trial session). 
Human Experimenters 
A series of novel exchangers, with whom the capuchins were familiar with but 
with whom they had never exchanged, were required for this test.  Note that using 
completely unfamiliar exchangers would have been impossible, as the monkeys become 
extremely agitated by strangers and refuse to interact with them.  In all but one case, the 
five novel individuals were used, each novel exchanger being used in only a single test.  
In the exceptional case (the Unreliable Exchanger Test; see below), the first author was 
the reliable exchanger, who never failed to provide a reward.  All exchangers had worked 
directly with the monkeys as research assistants for a minimum of 6 months and were 
familiar to all of the subjects from day to day interactions and other experimental 
procedures.  However, none of these monkeys had ever participated in an exchange 
experiment with any of these novel individuals.  Each subject saw a different 
experimenter for each of the tests, so there were no carry-over effects between the 
experimenter’s behavior in one test and another.  Because there were a limited number of 
appropriate experimenters, each test was run only a single time on each of the 10 
monkeys, to avoid the possibility that responses were learned over time. 
The monkeys appear to discriminate between the individuals with whom they 
interact, however, to make sure that experimenters were visually distinct, each individual 
wore a differently colored (but otherwise identical) shirt over the standard lab clothes.  
These shirt colors were consistent with the role of the experimenter throughout testing.  
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This procedure is sufficient for capuchins to distinguish between experimenters in other 
contexts (Chen et al., 2006). 
Experimental Methods 
Experimenter Preference Control 
 This test was a control to establish whether subjects preferred to return to one side 
of their enclosure over another or to one exchanger over another.  If subjects preferred 
one exchanger over the other when both were reliable, then it would be difficult to verify 
whether preferences which emerged in later experiments were due to a random 
preference or the actions of the experimenters. 
Trials consisted of 20 exchanges with familiar exchangers.  Exchangers took turns 
donating a token to the capuchin and exchangers switched position (e.g. left and right) 
after trial 10, so each exchanger donated one half of the time from each side.  Capuchins 
received the same reward regardless of their choice of the exchanger to whom to return 
the token.   
The movements during exchange were stereotyped, to control for the subject 
cueing on unintentional cues.  Each exchanger began two steps back from the test 
chamber.  The exchanger giving the rock stepped forward, gave the rock to the subject 
directly (to maximize recognition by the subject of which exchanger was the donor), then 
stepped back parallel with the second exchanger.  On cue from one exchanger, both 
stepped forward, placed their left hand on an “X” of tape on their side of a table in front 
of the test chamber, and placed their right hand, with the reward, up at the same height 
and distance from the cage, directly above the left hand.  All subsequent tests used this 
table to verify that the experimenters’ movements were coordinated and that neither was 
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closer to the subject.  We analyzed data to see if there was a tendency to A) exchange 
only on one side, B) exchange with only one individual, or C) exchange with the donor of 
the item.  These results were the baseline for comparison for later results. 
Location Preference Control 
In order to disentangle whether monkeys preferred to exchange to the same 
location vs. the same exchanger, we ran another test based on the Experimenter 
Preference Control.  This test was identical, except the experimenters alternated position 
between the monkey’s receipt of the rock and the offer to exchange.  If subjects preferred 
to return to the donor, they should follow that individual, however if they chose based on 
location, they should return to the non-donor. We analyzed the data to see if there was a 
tendency to A) exchange only on one side, B) exchange with only one experimenter, or 
C) exchange with the donor of the item.  These results were the baseline for comparison 
for later results. 
Unreliable Exchanger Test   
Here we explored the reactions of the subjects during their first encounter with an 
unreliable exchanger.  Virtually all of the subjects had been a part of this colony since 
their birth, and the one exception had not participated in exchange experiments in his 
previous lab.  Thus, we know that none had experienced an experimental test in which an 
exchange with an experimenter was not rewarded. 
The methodology was similar to the control tests.  The unreliable exchanger (one 
of the novel exchangers) placed a token in the test chamber, and then held up the reward 
being offered for exchange. The interaction commenced with 5 normal trials to verify 
baseline exchange latencies with the new exchanger.  After this, the exchanger failed to 
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give the offered reward on the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th of 20 trials, but instead placed 
the reward back in their pocket.  Following this, the known reliable exchanger (S.F.B.) 
ran five trials to see if any reactions were extrapolated across all exchangers, or were 
restricted to the cheater.   
We expected subjects to alter their latency to exchange, remove the item (e.g. 
throw the item out of the front of the test chamber), or refuse to exchange (e.g ignore the 
exchanger).  We compared responses between the initial exchanges and 1) the five 
unrewarded exchanges, 2) the 15 rewarded exchanges, and 3) the final (rewarded) 
exchanges with the reliable exchanger. 
New Experimenter Available Test 
 A subject exposed to an unreliable partner should be open to interactions with a 
novel partner whose reliability is untested.  Here we gauged subjects’ reactions when a 
new exchange partner was available to replace an unreliable exchanger.  This test 
commenced with 10 trials in which a novel, unreliable exchanger failed to reward 50% of 
the trials (determined using a random number table prior to the test).  For the second set 
of 10 trials, another novel exchanger (who was reliable) was present, and the subject 
could return the item to either exchanger.  The unreliable exchanger always donated the 
item.  To control for bias, the exchangers alternated sides after each exchange, but not 
between donation and return of the token.  The subject in this test served as a model for 
the following test.  We collected data on whether the subjects A) ceased exchanging, B) 
commenced exchanging with the reliable partner or C) continued to exchange with the 
unreliable partner.   
Social Influence on Partner Choice 
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 Identifying the tendencies of an exchange partner (e.g. cooperative or non-
cooperative) through observation of their interactions with a social partner rather than 
direct experience should benefit subjects.  In this way, the subject could immediately 
invest more in a cooperative partner, hence increasing payoffs, and avoid interaction with 
a non-cooperative partner, hence minimizing costs. 
 Subjects observed a social partner interact with an unreliable exchanger.  (This 
was the New Experimenter Available test for the social partner.)  We then gave the 
subjects 10 trials in which they could exchange with the unreliable exchanger or the 
reliable exchanger.  Unlike previous tests, both of the exchangers offered a token, 
allowing the subject to choose from whom to receive the item and, like previous tests, 
both exchangers rewarded identically for exchange.  The exchangers alternated position 
after every trial to control for side-biases.  We compared results to previous tests to 
ascertain the strength of any preference exhibited.  Due to the small number of available 
monkeys and exchangers, this test was run simultaneously with a New Experimenter 
Available test.  (The social partner was actually performing this test.)   
Statistics 
Our results indicated that subjects showed a bias, preferring to return tokens to 
one side of the experimental chamber.  Therefore, we performed the analysis using a 
side-correction procedure common to signal detection analysis.  The Correct Choice 
Measure (CCM) A’ is a non-parametric measure of discrimination sensitivity which 
controls for biased guessing (Grier, 1971).  The CCM varies between 0 and 1, with 0.5 
indicating chance performance (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). All statistical tests reported 
are on a total sample size of ten individuals, five male and five female. We conducted 
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comparisons between two dependent groups using the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Sum test. 
Note that while the sample size was ten for all tests except the Social Influence test (see 
details in Results), for some statistics smaller Ns are reported, due to ties.  Since the 
sample size was below 15, we used only exact tests (Mundry & Fischer, 1998). We used 
Friedman’s test for comparisons of multiple dependent variables.  Some chi-squared tests 
were run with individual subject’s data, and due to the small sample size, in every case 
the Yates continuity correction was applied.  All statistics are two-tailed. 
Results 
Exchanger Preference Control 
In this test, capuchins could choose to return a token to the donor or to a second 
experimenter present during the test.  Subjects preferred to return the token to the donor 
from whom the token was received (mean CCM = 0.71, t = 6.217, df =8, p < 0.001; one 
individual is not included as its results end up with a zero in the denominator when 
calculating the individual CCM).   
In a second version of this test, explicitly controlling for the location bias, the 
exchangers switched position following the donation of the token to the subject but 
before the monkey returned the token.  Thus, we examined whether subjects were more 
likely to return the token to the donor or to the side upon which the donation was made 
(e.g. were more likely to return it to the experimenter who had not donated the token).  In 
this case, subjects preferred to return the token to the other experimenter – the one who 
had not donated the token, but was now occupying the position from which the token was 
received (Figure 1; mean CCM = 0.80, t = 5.342, df = 9, p < 0.001), indicating a 
preference for returning the token to a location, but not an individual. 
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Unreliable Exchanger Test   
 For this condition, the experimenter failed to give the reward on some exchanges.  
There were no refusals to exchange in any of the unreliable exchanger tests, indicating 
that unreliability did not cause individuals to cease all interactions (although these 
monkeys will cease exchanging in other situations; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). However, 
the latency to exchange did vary between conditions (Figure 2: Friedman’s test; χ2 = 9.92, 
n = 10, df = 4, p = 0.04).  Looking at this in more detail, we found that the monkeys took 
the same amount of time to exchange with both experimenters in the first few, rewarded, 
trials with them (e.g. in the first 5 trials with the novel exchanger, before this 
experimenter failed to reward them and in the trials at the end with the familiar 
exchanger; Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Sum test T+ = 30, n =10, p = 0.423), indicating that 
during reliable series of exchanges the identity of the experimenter was irrelevant to them.  
These exchanges were also the longest latency, on average.  Subjects also did not differ 
in latency between their initial exchanges with the unreliable experimenter and those in 
which the experimenter failed to return a reward (initial vs unrewarded: T+ = 40, n = 10, 
p = 0.116).  However, subjects exchanged more rapidly when rewarded during these 20 
trials than they had in the initial sessions (initial vs rewarded: T+ = 49, n = 10, p = 0.014; 
initial vs rewarded trials immediately following unrewarded trials: T+ = 46, n = 10, p = 
0.032).  
New Experimenter Available Test 
 In this test, in which cheating was much more common (every other trial, on 
average, rather than every fifth trial), there was no difference in latency between initial 
trials, trials in which the experimenter failed to return a reward, and trials following these 
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episodes of unreliability (χ2 = 2.6, df = 1, p = 0.273).  When we looked at the average 
latency to exchange for each individual when “cheated” versus trials immediately after 
cheating, we found a significant difference, with individuals exchanging much more 
rapidly after they have been cheated (T+ = 49, n = 10, p = 0.014). 
 Although we saw no response to the unreliable exchanger in this or previous tests, 
it was possible that reactions were more subtle, such as choosing to interact with another 
individual.  Nevertheless, in this test subjects were more likely to return the token to the 
experimenter who gave it to them (CCM = 0.70, t = 4.169, df = 6, p = 0.006). Moreover, 
the magnitude of this preference did not differ from that of the original experimenter 
preference tests (original: t = -0.328, df = 6, p = 0.754; experimenters switch: t = 0.325, 
df = 6, p = 0.756).  
Social Influence on Partner Choice 
For this condition, subjects observed their partner’s interactions and then 
interacted with both experimenters.  Due to experimental difficulties, only six subjects 
completed this test (3 males and 3 females).  Again, subjects chose to return their token to 
the side from which it was received, without any apparent interest in which experimenter 
was more reliable (CCM = 0.75, t = 12.558, df = 3, p = 0.001).  Not all subjects 
completed all exchanges, opening up the possibility that subjects preferred to exchange in 
situations in which the reliable exchanger donated the token.  However, subjects showed 
no preference between returning the token to the cheating or non-cheating exchanger (all 
χ2 values are less than 0.62). 
Discussion 
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 Capuchin monkeys were exposed to a series of experimenters with whom they 
could complete a familiar task, exchanging a token for a reward.  Some of these 
experimenters were unreliable, routinely failing to give rewards to the subjects for 
completing the exchange (a situation which had never happened to them in any previous 
experiment).  Subjects appeared to recognize when exchangers were unreliable (that is, 
when exchanges were unrewarded), as the latency to complete the exchange significantly 
changed during trials which were interspersed with non-rewarded exchanges, in 
particular after unrewarded trials, perhaps indicating uncertainty about the outcome of the 
trial.  However, our original predictions were not met; when given the opportunity to 
choose between two exchangers, including the unreliable exchanger, subjects failed to 
show a change in preference away from the less reliable exchanger, regardless of whether 
the subject had experienced a large or small number of unrewarded exchanges.  This was 
true both when the other exchanger was known to be reliable from previous interactions 
with the subject (S.F.B in the Unreliable Exchanger Test) and when the other exchanger 
was novel, having never participated in an exchange task with the subject (New Partner 
Available Test).   
 Instead of showing a preference for one experimenter or the other, subjects 
apparently used location to determine with whom to exchange, returning the token to 
whomever was standing at the location from which they received it.  This led to the 
subjects preferring to interact with the donor (except in the second Experimenter 
Preference Test), regardless of which experimenter was more reliable. This is in contrast 
to chimpanzees, who learned to prefer generous exchangers (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul 
et al., 2008).  Not surprisingly, based on these results, subjects also did not learn to prefer 
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a reliable exchanger over one who was unreliable when watching another monkey 
participate (again, chimpanzees did learn to prefer the generous experimenter in this 
situation; Subiaul et al., 2008).  These results seem to indicate that monkeys do not 
change their behavior patterns when an experimenter occasionally fails to reward them 
for completing the exchange.   
 Although capuchin monkeys share many behaviors with chimpanzees, these 
species apparently behave differently when assessing the reliability of human 
experimenters. However, it is noteworthy that in the current experiment, even the 
unreliable experimenter gave the proffered reward on at least 50% of occasions (and 
more often in most conditions), while in the chimpanzee studies the ‘selfish’ 
experimenter never gave a reward (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008).  Thus, it 
may be that the level of cheating in the current experiment was too low to elicit a 
response.  It is also possible that the intermittent rewarding by the unreliable 
experimenter actually increased reinforcement for selecting the unreliable exchanger 
(Ferster & Skinner, 1957). 
 As with any study, there are several other possibilities which may explain 
negative results.  First, we chose experimenters who were familiar to the monkeys and 
had good relationships with them.  From a practical perspective, it is very difficult or 
impossible to get monkeys to work with individuals whom they do not know.  
Additionally most normal interactions among conspecifics involve individuals from their 
social group, with whom they have some history, even if in a novel situation, as here.  
However, it may be that the history that each experimenter had with the monkeys 
predisposed the monkeys to believe that the experimenters were basically reliable, and 
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that the events in this study were an anomaly.  In this case, the instances of non-
rewarding may have been taken in the larger context of the monkeys’ relationships with 
the experimenters, rather than the monkeys basing their reactions solely on the current 
experiment. 
 Additionally, we intentionally ran only one session per pair, as we were interested 
not in whether they could learn to prefer one experimenter over the other, but in their 
initial reaction to an unreliable experimenter.  Note that capuchins did learn to prefer one 
token over another after only a single session of observing a partner interact with the 
tokens (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004b).  However, Subiaul and colleagues (2008) found that 
while chimpanzees did not respond on initial interactions, they did so later on.  Thus, the 
capuchins may learn which experimenter is more reliable after more extensive 
interactions. 
 A final possibility is that the monkeys were not sufficiently motivated because the 
focus of the interaction was with the experimenter, who was not a conspecific.  However, 
this seems unlikely since capuchins are known to be highly sensitive to other situations in 
which the experimenter varies treatment between individuals (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; 
Fletcher, 2008; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), and chimpanzees responded to the reliability 
of experimenters in two previous experiments (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008).  
Moreover, in a very similar situation involving paired monkeys exchanging different 
tokens for foods of different value, monkeys can learn which token is the higher-value of 
the two simply by watching a conspecific interact with a human experimenter (Brosnan 
& de Waal, 2004b).   
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 It is of note that the subjects did not choose randomly between experimenters in 
this situation, but routinely preferred to return the token to the experimenter on the side 
from which they had received it. This it is possible that preference was masked by this 
strong location bias.  Similarly, chimpanzees’ performance can be affected when choices 
must be made between two different objects, as opposed to focusing on a single object, 
masking subjects’ abilities at tool use tasks (Girndt et al., 2008).  In future studies 
involving designs in which subjects must choose between two options, or two different 
experimenters, it is critical to take this location preference in to account. 
 These results indicate that capuchin monkeys are not sensitive to isolated 
incidents of unreliability by the experimenter in a simple exchange task.   This may 
indicate that these monkeys are making social judgments based not solely on the previous 
interaction, but on the history of the relationship.  However, this result could be due to a 
masking effect inherent in our experimental design, in which subjects showed strong 
location preference which may have over-ridden the effect of the manipulation.  Thus, we 
also note the necessity of assessing experimental designs for potential masking effects 
prior to drawing strong conclusions. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1:  Preference for the experimenter who donated the token (black bars) or the side 
on which the token was originally donated (hatched bars) for each of the 10 subjects.  
The y-axis indicates the choice for each individual, corrected for side bias using the 
Correct Choice Measure procedure (described the Statistics section), in which 0.5 is 
chance behavior.  WC is missing a value for the token series because the CCM 
calculation resulted in a zero in the denominator. 
 
Figure 2:  The average latency for the subject to return the token in each of the 
conditions during the Unreliable Exchanger Test.  The lines over the bars indicate 
significant differences (at the p > 0.05 level).   
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